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When legions thunder past:  
The Second World War and India’s north-
eastern frontier 
 
Article accepted for publication in War in History (September 2016). Please do 
not reproduce without permission. 
 
In 2013, the National Army Museum asked its audiences to select Britain’s greatest battle. The 
battle that won the poll was neither Waterloo nor D-Day, but Imphal and Kohima in 1944.1 
Though still a surprise for some, the result betrayed the resurgence of the China-Burma-India 
Theatre (CBI) in collective memories of the Second World War. The twin sieges arguably have 
many of the ingredients for a popular myth. When Japanese forces crossed into India in March 
1944, their goal was nothing less than to reverse the tide of the war in CBI, then turning in the 
Allies’ favour. Imphal, the capital of the princely state of Manipur, had the biggest 
concentration of Allied troops and supply bases in north-eastern India; Kohima, in Assam’s 
Naga Hills District, lay on the route for reinforcements. By taking the two towns, Japan hoped 
to prevent an Allied invasion of Burma and stop air supplies to Nationalist China. For three 
long months, the Allies fought tooth and nail and sometimes against the odds to repel the 
Japanese and the Indian National Army (INA). Fought in rugged, forested terrain and in the 
midst of the monsoon, Imphal and Kohima saw some of the fiercest hand-to-hand fighting in 
the Second World War. Thousands of Allied soldiers had been killed by the end of it. Yet more 
Japanese were dead still, and the victory was on the Allies’ side. Japan had lost a key 
opportunity to recover the initiative in CBI. More than that, its victorious foray into India turned 
into a full retreat: the Allies went on the offensive to retake Southeast Asia. 
To CBI veterans, long convinced of being a “forgotten army”, Imphal and Kohima’s newfound 
popularity has the taste of a vindication. The recent spate of military histories and memoirs on 
the two sieges and the Burma Campaign has probably contributed to the phenomenon. But the 
tale they tell is one of tactical twists and turns, and its main preoccupation lies with soldiers’ 
experiences. 2 What is still largely forgotten is how the Second World War affected the societies 
caught in the midst of CBI—the people of Assam, and especially of the neighbouring Patkai 
mountains. Almost uniquely in British India, the Patkai’s inhabitants directly lived through 
Japanese invasion; 3  yet we only have, to date, fragmentary if important information on their 
experiences.4 This article uses largely untapped government archives in India and Britain, 
                                                            
1 Angus MacSwan, 'Victory over Japanese at Kohima named Britain's greatest battle', Reuters, 21 April 
2013. 
2 For instance: D. D. Rooney, Burma victory: Imphal and Kohima March 1944 to May 1945, 2nd edn 
(London: Cassell, 2000); Robert Lyman and Peter Dennis, Kohima 1944: The battle that saved India 
(Oxford: Osprey, 2010); Mike Lowry, Fighting through to Kohima: A memoir of war in India and 
Burma (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2003); Fergal Keane, Road of bones: The siege of Kohima 1944 
(London: Harper, 2010); John Colvin, Not ordinary men: The story of the battle of Kohima, 3rd edn 
(Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2012); Louis Allen, Burma: The longest war 1941-45 (London: Dent, 1984); 
Jon Latimer, Burma: The forgotten war (London: John Murray, 2004). 
3 B. B. Lall, A regime of fears and tears: History of the Japanese occupation of the Andaman Islands, 
2nd edn (Delhi: Farsight, 2000). 
4 Jangkhomang Guite, 'Representing local participation in INA–Japanese Imphal campaign: The case 
of the Kukis in Manipur, 1943–45', Indian Historical Review, 37:2 (2010), 291-309; Pum Khan Pau, 
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contemporary press reports, as well private memoirs and diaries in order to sketch out the 
political, cultural and socio-economic transformations the Second World War caused across 
the Patkai. 
The marginalisation of the conflict’s local dimension is all the more problematic, this article 
argues, because it is difficult to understand the Patkai’s historical trajectory in the last seven 
decades without reference to it. The India-Burma borderlands’ sudden metamorphosis into a 
key frontline in a global conflict between 1942 and 1945 was a true upheaval for the Kuki, 
Meitei, Naga, Mizo or Kachin inhabitants of the region. War entailed an incredible number of 
changes, not always new but unprecedented in their concatenation over three short years. What 
was even more important was the nature of this sea-change. The war exerted powerful push-
and-pull effects—that is, complex and conflicting pressures—on the geo-body, political 
economy, and human landscape of the Patkai. Charles Tilly’s adage that “war made the state, 
and the state made war” holds true here: the Second World War caused an unprecedented 
penetration of the colonial state into the region, hitherto secluded and left to indirect rule.5 What 
war did not make, however, was the Indian nation—indeed, it rendered it even more difficult. 
For rather than integrating the Patkai into national space alongside state penetration, the 
conflict acted as an agent of ethnicisation and of transnationalisation—revivifying and 
expanding the region’s ties to the wider world beyond India. And yet, two years later, the Patkai 
was forcibly partitioned upon Burma and India’s independence from colonial rule. The close 
temporal succession of the conflict and the transfer of power would make the making of post-
colonial nations that much more challenging and divisive in the India-Southeast Asia 
borderlands. 
 
On the edge of war 
 
CBI veterans remember the Patkai as a maze of abrupt ridges and deep valleys covered in 
impenetrable jungle, without modern infrastructure, and where exceptional rainfall fosters ideal 
conditions for malaria, leeches, disease and despair—a place so unforgiving as to feel like hell 
on earth.6 In fact, the region had historically been a human, economic and cultural crossroads 
between the Indian sub-continent, the Southeast Asian peninsula, and Inner Asia. If the Patkai 
appeared remote and forgotten, it was because of its encounter with colonialism. British rule 
had created arbitrary divisions between Burma and India and undermined the transregional ties 
and cross-cultural interaction that characterized the Patkai’s human landscape. It had also 
artificially secluded the hills from the plains—and purposely kept the highlands beyond the 
pale of direct state presence. 
A brief sketch of the Patkai’s history until the eve of the war will underscore just how disruptive 
the colonial experience was for local societies and their ties to the rest of the world. Despite its 
elevation (up to 3,826 meters), the range had been crossed by ancient trade routes linking 
                                                            
'Tedim road—The strategic road on a frontier: A historical analysis', Strategic Analysis, 36:5 (2012), 
776-786; Pum Khan Pau, 'Situating local events in geo-political struggles between the British and 
Japanese empires: The politics of Zo participation during the Second World War', The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 42:4 (2014), 667-692. 
5 Charles Tilly, 'Reflections on the history of European state-making', in The formation of national 
states in Western Europe, ed. by C. Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p.42. 
6 Slim, the British commander on the Burma front, described it as ‘‘some of the world’s worst country, 
breeding the world’s worst diseases, and having for half the year at least the world’s worst climate”. 
William J. Slim, Defeat into victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945 (New York: 
Cooper Square Press, 2000 (1956)), p. 172. 
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Bengal and Assam to Tibet, Burma and China.7 Interconnected networks of religious 
patronage, marriage alliances, and labour systems linked the Patkai and surrounding areas, 
networks in turn connected to multiple migratory flows.8 Labour shortages and fertile lowlands 
generated regular movement and socio-cultural interaction between the Patkai and the 
lowlands, economically interdependent.9 
The region was therefore marked by abundant cultural, linguistic and religious diversity and 
fluidity. The Imphal Valley hosted the kingdom of Manipur, whose Meitei inhabitants spoke a 
Tibeto-Burman language and practised Hinduism. Naga groups holding a variety of indigenous 
beliefs lived in the central Patkai. Related people lived further to the north—such as the Noctes, 
influenced by Assamese Vaishnavism. Kachin groups inhabited the foothills east and west of 
the northern Patkai. In the south lived various “Zo” groups—Chins, Paites, Kukis, Mizos. 
Many of these groups were still on the move when colonial rule first arrived in north-eastern 
India.10 From one angle they arguably formed a ethno-geographic space in its own right, Zomia, 
rather than being part of the more familiar geographic constructions of South, Southeast, or 
Inner Asia.11 
Yet, in the century preceding the war, the gradual consolidation of British rule in neighbouring 
Assam and Burma had fractured the Patkai. Assam’s transformation into a frontier of global 
capitalism had dispossessed and territorialised the Patkai’s inhabitants, and eventually secluded 
them within the highlands. Initially keen to develop trade routes with China via the Patkai and 
the Himalayas, colonial authorities in Assam had abandoned their projects, deeming the 
difficulties of terrain and war-related devastation too great.12 Instead, they turned the 
neighbouring Brahmaputra and Surma Valleys into a land of tea plantations, coal fields, and 
rubber and timber extraction. The foot of the hills became prime land for these commercial 
enterprises, and tea planters and forestry departments appropriated the land with the help of 
colonial property regimes. Stripped of their shifting cultivation fields and hunting or fishing 
grounds in the plains, prevented from accessing trade centres, the Nagas or the Kukis were 
increasingly circumscribed to the highlands.13 
The Patkai’s isolation intensified with British conquests and colonial efforts to enforce a legal 
and territorial compartmentalization between hills and plains. Highland inhabitants had 
responded to colonial and capitalist constraints on their lives by attacking tea gardens or plains 
settlements, and sometimes through full-scale uprisings.14 British authorities framed these 
incidents as the result of an age-old opposition between hills and plains: one the land of 
savagery, primitiveness, and statelessness, the other the realm of civilisation, order, and 
modernity. Recast as lawless “tribes” always ready for predatory “raids”, the Kachins, the 
Kukis, or the Nagas became a threat to the Empire’s good subjects in the Assam plain, and to 
                                                            
7 Gunnel Cederlöf, Founding an empire on India's north-eastern frontiers, 1790-1840: Climate, 
commerce, polity (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 82-86. 
8 Indrani Chatterjee, Forgotten friends: Monks, marriages, and memories of Northeast India (New 
Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
9 Jangkhomang Guite, 'Colonialism and its unruly? The colonial state and Kuki raids in nineteenth 
century Northeast India', Modern Asian Studies, 48:5 (2013), 1188-1232, (pp. 1191-93). 
10 Joy L. K. Pachuau, Being Mizo: Identity and belonging in Northeast India (Oxford: OUP, 2014), pp. 
100-101; Pum Khan Pau, 'Administrative rivalries on a frontier: Problem of the Chin-Lushai Hills', 
Indian Historical Review, 34:1 (2007), 187-209, (p. 189). 
11 Willem van Schendel, 'Geographies of knowing, geographies of ignorance: Jumping scale in 
Southeast Asia', Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 20: (2002), 647-668. 
12 Cederlöf, Founding an empire. (Chapter 4). 
13 e.g. Guite, 'Colonialism and its unruly?'. 
14 Ibid.; Mandy Sadan, Being and becoming Kachin: Histories beyond the state in the borderworlds of 
Burma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). (Chapter 1). 
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its allied economic interests.15 Eventually, British authorities “pacified” the Patkai through 
brutal military campaigns. Piecemeal annexation followed over the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, without regard for ethnic divisions or trans-local links. Instead, the Patkai’s 
partition largely hinged on the provenance of colonial military expeditions—whether Assam, 
Bengal, or Burma, the administrative entity responsible for the conquest of a given area 
assumed jurisdiction over it. A few territorial adjustments were later made, always based on 
perceived administrative convenience. The Patkai’s people found themselves secluded and 
divided between entities that would later claim to be nation-states.16 
What’s more, colonial constructions of the Nagas or the Kukis as fundamentally alien and 
beyond the pale of modernity came to underpin the entire logic of British rule in the region: 
the region was insulated from the outside world and from direct state control. From 1873 
onwards, an Inner Line prohibited British subjects from entering the hills without a government 
permit, and Patkai inhabitants from crossing into “settled” areas  – further cutting off trade, 
interaction and cultural  networks between hills and plains.17 The Inner Line also became the 
territorial limit of colonial direct rule: the Patkai was deemed economically uninteresting and 
too backward for regular administration. In “administered” areas, government-anointed chiefs 
and headmen were entrusted with collecting house-tax, sourcing labour, and maintaining the 
peace; a handful of frontier officials in government outposts supervised them, backed by para-
military Assam Rifles and “interpreters”. A limited number of bridle tracks and mule paths 
were built to enable governmental movement and symbolise colonial authority. Their 
construction and maintenance were assured by the inhabitants themselves, concurrently forced 
to carry supplies.18 American and European missions enabled the state to remain in the 
background. In the Naga and Lushai Hills District, they built dispensaries and village schools, 
spreading the written word in an oral culture and reducing linguistic diversity.19 As we shall 
see, this was only one way in which society and culture in the Patkai were durably affected by 
the colonial encounter, never more so than during the war. 
In the early 1940s, the Patkai therefore appeared to belong to Asia’s non-state spaces. The 
range was beyond the bounds of regular administration and part of the northern Naga areas and 
southern Lushai Hills remained fully un-administered (directly or not).20 Early twentieth 
century constitutional reforms had reinforced the divide between hills and plains: when British 
authorities decided to implement limited power devolution in India and Burma, they decided 
that trans-Inner Line areas were too backward and too different to be concerned. The Patkai 
would remain beyond the pale of elected Indian governments. Some scholars have since 
interpreted the region’s encounter with colonialism as a sign that its inhabitants consciously 
                                                            
15 Boddhisattva Kar, 'When was the postcolonial? A history of policing impossible lines', in Beyond 
counter-insurgency: Breaking the impasse in Northeast India, ed. by Sanjib Baruah (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), pp.49-77; Sanjib Baruah, India against itself: Assam and the politics of 
nationality (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), pp. 28-38. 
16 Pau, 'Administrative rivalries on a frontier'. 
17 Chatterjee, Forgotten friends. (Chapter 5). 
18 Lipokmar Dzuvichu, 'Roads and the Raj: The politics of road building in colonial Naga Hills, 
1860s–1910s', The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 50:4 (2013), 473–494; Lipokmar 
Dzuvichu, 'Empire on their backs: Coolies in the eastern borderlands of the British Raj', International 
Review of Social History, 59:Supplement (2014), 89-112; Joy Pachuau and Willem Van Schendel, 
The camera as witness: A social history of Mizoram, northeast India (Cambridge: CUP, 2015). 
Chapter 8. 
19 Richard Maxwell Eaton, 'Conversion to Christianity among the Nagas, 1876-1971', Indian Economic 
& Social History Review, 21:1 (1984), 1-44. 
20 New Delhi, NAI, External Affairs Proceedings (1947), Extension of regular administration to the 
Naga Hills Tribal Area, 71-NEF/47; Pachuau and Van Schendel, The camera as witness. (Chapter 6). 
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rejected the state and its entrapments.21 Yet, to the extent that a clear distinction between state 
space and non-state space existed, it was as much the product of British rule. The Kachins, 
Mizos, and Nagas had been excluded from whatever opportunities the state could have brought 
by colonial policies and discourses.22 And in the same breath, the colonial encounter had 
undercut their transregional connections and split them apart, through a border that negated 
their presence in order to produce a neat divide between India and Burma. 
 
Figure 1. Jakhama, a Naga village in the Patkai 
Source: Cambridge Centre of South Asian Studies (CSAS), Pawsey Papers, Box A102, 
Album 18. 
 
The making of a geo-strategic hotspot 
 
Direct state presence was thus at a minimum when a global war materialised on the Patkai’s 
doorstep in 1942. In March, Japan conquered Burma after sweeping over much of Southeast 
Asia in the winter. Invasion rumours spread throughout India. In China, the Guomindang 
government feared that its capacity to fight on was doomed, now that the last land route to the 
Allies and their supplies had been lost. And yet the Japanese advance was to stop there, in the 
Patkai—on the edge of India. Over the next few years, the Assam plain and the highlands 
would turn into the Allies’ military bulwark against Tokyo. In the process, the Second World 
War would cause an unprecedented intensification of direct colonial state control in the Patkai. 
Administrative expansion would gain momentum in tandem with pervasive militarisation. De 
jure or de facto territorial adjustments would take place. Major infrastructural works would 
remodel the landscape, along with widespread deforestation. Crucially—and there lay the 
fundamentally paradoxical effect of the war—this newly blatant state presence would not be 
distinctly Indian. On the contrary, it would facilitate the revivification and reconfiguration of 
the Assam highlands’ local and transnational ties. 
War and attendant state penetration first reared their head in the Patkai with the humanitarian 
crisis caused by the arrival of Burma refugees in March 1942. Indians and Europeans had begun 
fleeing Burma long before Rangoon’s evacuation. Initially they travelled by ship and plane, or 
via the Arakan coast; but when the Japanese advance closed off these escape routes, the Patkai 
Range became their last hope of reaching India. Scores of men, women, and children with very 
little to eat or clothe themselves travelled through the Chindwin Valley, climbing up to the 
border at Tamu before descending into Manipur. Others went further north, crossing the 
Chaukan Pass to arrive in upper Assam. A few went up the northern route via the Lohit Valley. 
The monsoon was barely starting, food was scarce, and disease rife. 23  
Faced with an emergency—albeit one in which the fate of white refugees mattered far more—
Assam and Manipur authorities improvised, backed up by the private sector. Across the border, 
Delhi’s agent in Burma had appointed all able men he could find to try to regulate the exodus.24 
                                                            
21 James C. Scott, The art of not being governed: An anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia (New 
Haven, CO; London: Yale University Press, 2009); Guite, 'Colonialism and its unruly?'. 
22 Charles Patterson Giersch, 'Across Zomia with merchants, monks, and musk: process geographies, 
trade networks, and the Inner-East–Southeast Asian borderlands', Journal of Global History, 5:2 (2010), 
215-239; Cederlöf, Founding an empire, p. 11; Sadan, Being and becoming Kachin, p. 73; Jelle J. P. 
Wouters and Tanka B. Subba, 'The “Indian face,” India's Northeast, and “the idea of India”', Asian 
Anthropology, 12:2 (2013), 126-140; Pachuau, Being Mizo; Bérénice Guyot-Réchard, Shadow States: 
India, China and the Himalayas, 1910-1962 (Cambridge: CUP, 2017). 
23 Hugh Tinker, 'A forgotten long march: The Indian exodus from Burma, 1942', Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 6:1 (1975), 1-15. 
24 Cambridge, CSAS, Tayabji Papers (n.d.), The Burma story. 
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Assisted by European tea planters, Indian authorities scrambled to provide for the exhausted 
refugees who managed to reach the border. Plantation workers and government staff 
improvised a series of stage camps and carried food into the highlands,25 while the Indian Army 
built a fifty-four mile tarmac road from the border to the foothills over just eight weeks—
enabling refugees to travel on to the rail-head at Dimapur, on the edge of Assam.26 This wartime 
state intervention into the Patkai was the first of many. 
 
Figure 2. The Indian Tea Association at work in the Patkai 
Source: CSAS, Pawsey Papers, Box A102, Album 18. 
 
Meanwhile in Burma, the Allied debacle was worsening. Chinese and British Indian troops 
were retreating even faster than the refugees, forcing Manipur authorities to go into the 
highlands to warn villagers to hide away their property and food. The Japanese stopped at the 
foot of the Patkai at the start of the monsoon, but devastating air-raids on Imphal in May 1942 
underscored how close they were.27 The defence of the Raj was now of the highest priority, 
and it was in Assam and its borderlands that it would have to be ensured. Compared to the 
hasty, mostly in-and-out efforts to manage the refugee exodus, militarisation would cause a far 
more durable intensification of state penetration in the Patkai. 
Over the course of 1942, north-eastern India became a huge military camp. Allied troops 
poured in to bolster India’s eastern defences. 51 British army units and 47 US air squadrons 
took residence in Assam and Manipur, amounting to 340,000 Indian, 100,000 British, 90,000 
West African, 65,000 Chinese, and 10,000 American troops.28 Some Naga villages were now 
surrounded by military camps, relocating as a result.29 At one stage, the 2,000 square miles of 
Manipur’s Imphal Valley had 200,000 troops for 333,000 inhabitants. The British Residency 
faced a ceaseless stream of cypher-messages, meetings with Eastern Command officers deep 
into the night, and army requests for monetary advances.30 Countless private and government 
buildings were taken over, sometimes without warning. Half of Meitei houses were seized. 
This was far from enough, so land too was requisitioned to build barracks, hospitals, 
sanatoriums, water-plants, pipelines, and arsenals. Forests became a hidden casualty of the war, 
as bamboo, thatch, and timber were cut down for shelter and firewood. Allied troops also 
needed food, hundreds and thousands of tons of food. Grow More Food campaigns were 
launched in Assam’s fertile valleys and a seed distribution scheme around Imphal. Soon, the 
Meiteis were selling 20-40,000 lbs of fresh vegetables a day to military depots.31 
Just as momentous for state-building were the massive investments in transport infrastructure 
required to defend north-eastern India and retake Burma. The frontline was 900 miles away 
from its supply base at Calcutta, and there were no roads fit for military use in the Patkai.32 
Thousands of workers were brought into the hills to build a rail and road network between 
Assam, Manipur and Burma in conditions of extreme danger and difficulty. Existing routes 
                                                            
25 Cambridge, CSAS, Whyte Papers (March-May 1942), Diary of the evacuation scheme; Geoffrey 
Tyson, Forgotten frontier (Calcutta: W.H. Targett, 1945). 
26 Tinker, 'A forgotten long march', (p. 8). 
27 Cambridge, CSAS, Gimson Papers (n.d.), Notes on the war in Manipur, p.4; Cambridge, CSAS, 
Gimson papers (n.d.), The bombing of Imphal. 
28 'The campaign in Burma' (London: Central Office of Information, 1946). 
29 Itanagar, APSA, NEFA Secretariat (1943), Tour diaries of the PO Tirap, EX/225/43. (17 January 
1944). 
30  CSAS, Gimson Papers, Notes on the war, p.2. 
31 Cambridge, CSAS, Gimson Papers (n.d.), Wartime economics, p.1. 
32 The only notable road in the Lushai Hills at the time was thus fit only for carts. Pachuau and Van 
Schendel, The camera as witness, p. 161. 
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were expanded, doubled in width, and covered with tarmac—all thanks to people working with 
very limited tools, and sometimes by hand. Major new arteries were created, starting with the 
asphalted road from Palel (near Imphal) to Tamu, the fastest and easiest entry point into Burma. 
This traditional corridor removed “any possibility of surprise”,33 so army engineers built a 265-
km road through eastern Manipur to Tiddim in Burma’s Chin Hills, yet unoccupied by Japan. 
Completed in May 1943, the road enabled Indian troops to infiltrate the Burma side of the 
Patkai and confront advancing Japanese troops.34 
One artery mattered above all others, however: the road that would recreate a land link between 
the Allies and besieged China. From December 1942 onwards, thousands of workers and 
hundreds of engineers worked unceasingly to build a road from Ledo, in upper Assam, to 
northern Burma and on to Yunnan. Two four-inch pipelines, supplying fuel from the Digboi 
oil fields in Assam, were built alongside it. Nothing—whether leeches, monsoon, wild tigers, 
landslides, dysentery nor malaria—was allowed to stand in the way. The resulting human toll 
was so high the road earned an unhappy nickname: “A man a mile”.35 
 
Figure 3. Building roads and irrigation channels 
Source: CSAS, Pawsey Papers, Box A102, Album 18. 
 
Until the Ledo Road could be completed however, Nationalist China still had to be saved from 
asphyxiation. Moreover, airpower was crucial in the Allies’ struggle against Japan. Airfields 
were thus as strategic as roads. North-eastern India became the centre-piece of an aerial lifeline 
to Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. From June 1942 to September 1945, American planes risked the 
dangers of the aerial route across the Patkai and the eastern Himalayas—the “Hump”—almost 
every day to airlift 650,000 tons of goods and weapons to Yunnan.36 Assam and Manipur had 
had very few airfields at the start of the war; by the end of it, the Patkai and Himalayan foothills 
were peppered with them. 
Dramatic in itself, the impact of militarisation on the Patkai should further be grasped in terms 
of the momentum it generated for administrative expansion in the highlands. Hard pressed to 
cope with the challenges of Allied presence, colonial authorities noticeably stepped up their 
presence. The biggest challenge was to intensify government control in administered areas, and 
to expand it in the un-administered Naga hills and eastern Himalayas. In 1943, an Adviser to 
the Governor of Assam was especially appointed to spearhead the momentum and hire more 
frontier staff.37 That same year, a new administrative unit, the Tirap Frontier Tract, brought the 
areas around the Ledo Road under closer administration.38  
It is in this context that the push-and-pull effects of the war—of its state-making and 
transnationalising impact—can first be detected. For, even as the war created an atmosphere of 
feverish military and administrative expansion, it concurrently and inadvertently blended 
Assam and Burma’s frontier administrations, making moot the Patkai’s colonial 
territorialisation. Viewed from the region, the distinction between India and Burma was 
                                                            
33 Ian Lyall Grant, Burma: The turning point (Chichester: Zampi Press, 1993), p. 35. 
34 Pau, 'Tedim road'. 
35 Yasmin Khan, The Raj at war: A people's history of India's Second World War (London: The Bodley 
Head, 2015). (Chapter 19). 
36 Yikun Ge and Wei Li, 'Links between Yunnan and India during the Second World War', in India and 
China in the colonial world, ed. by Madhavi Thampi (New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2005), pp.193-
198; John Plating, The Hump: America's strategy for keeping China in World War II (College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2011). 
37 London, BL, IOR (1937-1947), Burma-Assam border: Extension of the control area in the Naga Hills, 
IOR/L/PS/12/3116. (Revision of the eastern boundary of the Naga Hills District, 15 July 1942). 
38  APSA, EX/225/43. 
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anyhow rather superficial. Cross-border ties notwithstanding, Burma had been an Indian 
province until 1937 and its boundary with Assam remained undemarcated, when not 
undelimited. But the war blurred India and Burma’s spheres of influence even further.  Pressed 
by manpower shortages, Indian authorities “borrowed” Burma officials, in ample supply since 
they had taken refuge in India.39 Assam and Manipur were included in the newly founded 
South-East Asia Command, and the Indian Standard Time was pushed an hour ahead—a 
change to the benefit of the region, which lay far to the east of Delhi.40 
As importantly, the need to provide a lifeline to guerrillas and populations across the border 
made the Assam Government responsible for preserving a facade of administrative normalcy 
in what remained of British Burma. A few colonial officials remained there, trying to keep 
Japanese forces at bay. Despairing of their own Government, now exiled in northwestern India, 
some looked to Assam for guidance. “Burma […] is not suitable to administer this District”, 
argued the Chin Hills District Commissioner, angered by the lack of support. His preference 
was for India to take control. 
 
“They have no standing in India and only make another obstacle to be got over. […] When 
communications with Govt broke down I seized finance and control authority throughout the 
district and I don’t intend to give it up now. The situation does not admit of obtaining sanction for 
this and that. I sanction it and tell Govt about it later. If they don’t like it they must get someone 
else. […] I agree that we should be attached to Assam.41 
 
In some regions, this reattachment of the Burma highlands to India had de facto taken place. 
Officials from Assam’s Lushai Hills District now assumed the duties of local district officers 
in northern Arakan—hearing and trying robbery cases, releasing prisoners, and discussing 
house tax and village boundaries with local chiefs.42 In the northern Patkai, the newly appointed 
Tirap Political Officer was touring neighbouring parts of Burma, and local Kachins and Nagas 
were coming to his outpost to settle their disputes.43 
In short, the war was “forg[ing…] a bloodstained unity” between northeastern India and 
southeastern Asia—and the Patkai was at the heart of this reconfiguration.44 This strategic and 
administrative wartime entanglement led London to explore a scheme championed by the 
Governor of Assam, a Crown Colony that would merge Burma and north-eastern India’s 
highlands, creating a new unit under the British Crown’s direct sovereignty. Shelved at the 
insistence of Burma officials in late 1942, the plan was never seriously reconsidered after 
1945.45 Short-lived though it was, the Crown Colony scheme would nevertheless contribute to 
fueling political aspirations among the Patkai’s people—aspirations that, for some, did not 
involve belonging to India. 
 
A stream of change 
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The combination of a deeper, more direct colonial state presence with India and Burma’s 
increased administrative entanglement and discussions on a Crown Colony was the first sign 
of the Second World War’s paradoxical impact on the Patkai. The conflict’s second major push 
and pull was societal rather than governmental. Countless changes and tensions (small and big, 
positive or not) were re-shaping the fabric of local tribal societies. As we shall see, they ranged 
from extreme labour extraction to monetisation, from urbanisation to demographic change, 
from marketisation to new tastes, habits and occupations, from cultural change to the spread of 
education and, last but not least, enhanced political mobilisation. Not all these changes were 
new, for colonialism had powerfully affected Patkai societies even while the state remained at 
a distance. What was unprecedented, however, was the concatenation of these myriad changes 
over the short time span of the war.  Moreover, many of them further undercut the existing 
colonial reification of the Assam highlands as part of India’s geo-body—and of neighbouring 
regions as part of Burma and China.46 
One of the most immediate societal changes was that labour extraction reached unprecedented 
levels. This was, in the first place, to mobilise the Patkai’s inhabitants against Japan—another 
reason for administrative expansion. With the help of Allied intelligence services (called 
Special Operations Executives), frontier officials recruited Kachin, Chin or Naga villagers into 
“levies”, small bands meant to harass the Japanese, wearing them out and preventing large-
scale attacks on the frontline. This they did, through a mixture of Western and indigenous 
warfare. Sharpened (and sometimes poisoned) bamboo spikes, called panjis, half-hidden in the 
ground were used to great effect. Many highlanders also joined the para-military Assam Rifles 
and the newly formed Assam Regiment. By inflicting regular physical and psychological 
damage, these guerrilla tactics contributed to keeping Japanese forces at bay.47  
The Patkai’s inhabitants further came to play a variety of non-combatant roles. Some acted as 
informants, whether casually or as members of the V Force, a corps primarily dedicated to 
reconnaissance and intelligence gathering whose officers had all been selected for their 
knowledge of tribal languages and peoples. Others among the Khamtis, Kachins, or Nagas 
rescued lost strangers, from starving Burma refugees to stranded Ledo Road engineers.48 They 
also proved essential as porters—a crucial function since, road-building notwithstanding, most 
of the Patkai could only be reached on foot. Some worked in road construction, others 
monitored vehicular traffic. Some Angami Nagas thus worked for free to hasten the completion 
of the Ledo Road, while corporations of young Nagas serviced motor vehicles at selected points 
along the road.49 
This contribution was not necessarily voluntary, and some inhabitants resisted joining the 
Allied war effort. They deserted military and auxiliary forces, when they did not choose to join 
the Japanese or the INA. One man stands out in particular: Zaphu Phizo, an Angami Naga. In 
1942, Phizo was in self-imposed exile in Rangoon, having refused to accept British rule. To 
achieve independence, he decided to cooperate with the Japanese and joined the INA, fighting 
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alongside them and, eventually, being captured and jailed.50 Phizo would eventually lead the 
Naga struggle for independence against post-colonial India. In the case of the Kukis, a group 
centred on the Manipur highlands, there is evidence that the majority sentiment favoured the 
Japanese. The Kukis had revolted en masse against conscription during the First World War, 
and resentment was still high. When they learnt of Japan’s conquests, they took it as the 
realisation of an old prophecy, Nongpok Thong Hangani: when Manipur’s “Eastern Gate 
(would) open”, they would get an opportunity to end British rule. In late 1943, the son of a 
1917 rebellion leader crossed the Chindwin along with dozens of followers to forge an alliance 
with the Japanese. The meeting was sealed with a feast. For the remainder of the war, Kukis in 
Allied-controlled territory actively mobilised against the Allies, whose forces they often 
deserted, and provided sizeable support for the Japanese. Their chiefs canvassed support 
through village meetings, distributed pamphlets, and sent their men for training in Japanese 
territory. When the battles for Imphal and Kohima came, many Kukis joined Japan and the 
INA as combatants, porters, and guides, and many more provided them with food, shelter, and 
intelligence.51 
In the nearby Lushai Hills District conversely, colonial authorities secured greater support 
thanks to their reliance on chiefs. Since their arrival in the region, they had remodeled Mizo 
power hierarchies into a systematic institution of chieftainship, with heightened control over 
local communities. The number of chiefs had ballooned from two dozen in the late nineteenth 
century to some 350 in the 1940s, providing frontier officials with intermediaries in almost 
each village.52 When news of Japan’s advance reached the Lushai Hills, the District 
Superintendent, Tony McCall, called all the chiefs to Aizawl, presenting it as threat to the 
Lushai Hills motherland against which everyone—frontier administration, chiefs and 
commoners—should unite. On 3 April 1942, 300 chiefs pledged their allegiance and their will 
to fight around the Union Jack. McCall’s next step was to have the chiefs spread a manifesto 
calling each Mizo and Paite village to join a Total Defence Scheme against the Japanese. 
People prepared food and weapon stockpiles and jungle hideouts, learnt to survive air raids and 
black outs, undertook construction and infrastructural works, or joined labour and fighting 
corps at home and all across India. Plans were made to evacuate the villages and obstruct the 
district’s paths with boulders should the Japanese intrude, and men were organised into gunmen 
(pasalthas) ready to defend their villages and harass the Japanese. Villages fortified themselves, 
some taking the appearance of “an enormous hedgehog”. (Many preferred to join the Labour 
Corps however, because it paid more). Military authorities found it too heterodox for their 
liking, so McCall was soon removed from office; but the Total Defence Scheme helped to deter 
further Japanese advance into the Patkai and the Lushai Hills became the most 
comprehensively mobilised part of the region.53 Never before had manpower extraction been 
so great in the Patkai. 
The Second World War simultaneously ushered an influx of manpower into the Patkai—and it 
did not just come from the subcontinent but from all four corners of the globe. With Assam on 
the frontline, countless nationalities could now be found beyond the Inner Line, communicating 
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with one another through “a sort of contrived Esperanto”.54 Traversed by the Ledo Road, the 
new Tirap Frontier Tract turned into “the most glorious ‘hotch-potch’ imaginable”: workers 
brought into the hills to work on military projects (many of them Adivasis from Assam’s tea 
plantations); Chinese soldiers under American command; Gurkhas, Sikhs or Punjabis from the 
Indian Army; Nepali graziers and tribals from Assam’s “settled” districts; and Kachin refugees 
from Burma’s Hukawng Valley.55 The Ledo Road was being built by people from all over India 
yet it simultaneously looked “provincially American […], with small specialised communities 
representing the same hometown or the same area”.56 The colonial compartmentalisation 
between the Patkai and the rest of the world all but collapsed. 
In the process, the Patkai and the Himalayas’ capacity to act as a nodal point between different 
parts of Asia was restored. The wartime porosity of borders encouraged human and economic 
flows across India’s borderlands with Tibet, China and Burma, which intensified and 
expanded.57 Chinese, Tibetan or Marwari merchants quickly grasped the benefit of an expanded 
transport network and heightened wartime requirements. The presence of army depots created 
further profit opportunities. Licit or not, trade was on the rise between Assam, northern Burma 
and the Sino-Tibetan marches. Shops were appearing beyond the Inner Line without the 
administration’s knowledge, and the circulation of opium accelerated.58 Tibetan silver coins 
and paper notes (some of them forged, reportedly) were being siphoned out of Tibet, causing 
important coin shortages in parts of the plateau. Quantity of Chinese notes could likewise be 
found for sale in Assam despite the Guomindang’s prohibition on their export, while the rupee 
travelled in the reverse direction to be found in abundance in parts of Tibet—like connected 
spatial vessels.59 
Money was not just circulating through the hills but making deeper inroads there. Monetisation 
predated the war: colonial authorities had instituted house-tax in “administered” areas, 
encouraged small shops near outposts and the Inner Line, and paid coolie loads in cash. 60 In a 
particularly intense example of a trend affecting much of India, the wartime state’s increased 
intrusion in society went hand in hand with the acceleration of monetary penetration.61 An 
unprecedented number of tribals enrolled into wage labour in the Patkai, initially under 
compulsion. But as manpower shortages led levies, military projects, and tea gardens to 
compete for workers, salaries rose. The Nagas’ earning power rose from four or five annas a 
day before the war to five rupees.62 Roadwork became lucrative, and even preferable to 
cultivation. Many people shed their reluctance to join the Assam Rifles, even after the war, 
leading to a long-term increase in the non-Gurkha elements of the force.63 And where paying 
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the house-tax had burdened many households in the administered Patkai, villagers could now 
earn many times its value.64 
Wartime shortages meant that locals often struggled to use their hard-earned cash. From oil, 
sugar, and cloth to paper, medicines or whisky, myriad things were in very short supply.65 
Given their frontline location, the Imphal Valley and the Patkai were particularly affected: land 
requisitions and the influx of troops, construction workers and supply organisations put 
extreme pressure on local communities’ food production capacity. Roads and barracks 
encroached on precious cultivation grounds, while bombs and ambushes often scared villagers 
away from their fields. Roadworks and military projects were pushing people away from 
agriculture, whether by force or due to the enticements of high wages: in the Manipur 
highlands, the agricultural output further dropped.66 The situation was at its worst in the hills, 
where arable land was scarce and traditional shifting cultivation not suited to high population 
densities. Nor could supplies be easily brought in to fulfil people’s needs: Assam’s transport 
network choked under the weight of military requirements, making the supply situation 
extremely tense in areas far removed from the rail-head, like the Lushai Hills. Galloping 
inflation ensued. A bag of rice once sold for one and a half rupees now cost forty or even sixty 
rupees—the authorities bought foodstuff at such a price that the only way to compete was to 
pay even more.67 The entire food sufficiency of highland societies was in danger. 
Nascent urbanisation contributed to the situation. No towns had existed in the Patkai before 
1942. Dimapur, the gateway to the Naga Hills and to Manipur, had only been a small outpost 
in a “deadly piece of jungle”. Now however, it had morphed into a boom-town, courtesy of its 
“first-class base”, airport and rail terminus.68 In the Burma Patkai, Kalewa, another trade 
outpost, became “a mass of basha [improvised] homes and shops, and during the rainy season 
[…] a veritable sea of mud” as the war progressed. Cosmopolitan, these towns also contributed 
to an altered ethnic make-up in the Patkai. Some of their residents decided to stay after the war, 
like Gurkha servicemen, ensuring that ethnic transformations would outlast the conflict.69  
Visible in this demographic change and growing long-distance trade, the wartime 
cosmopolitanisation of the Patkai was also evident in the variety of novel goods and habits 
making their way into the hills as a result of Allied army’s presence. Cigarettes, matches, tinned 
beef, thermos flasks, mirrors, mugs, plates, or bicycles—to cite but a few products—could now 
be bought in the Patkai and the Imphal Valley.70 The Meiteis, traditional consumers of jaggery, 
took a liking to refined white sugar. They soon began to sell their own sugarcane to the Army 
at profitable rates, buying sugar with the proceeds.71 In the Naga Hills Districts, the 
infrastructure of villages was evolving, likely under the influence of wartime constructions and 
materials. By the end of the war, expensive but durable corrugated steel was replacing thatch 
roofs on Naga houses, and some communities were planning their electrification. People 
installed pipes and tanks to supply water directly to their villages, whose hilltop situation had 
historically meant a long trek to the river down below. “It is an odd commentary on the war 
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these remote villages should now better be equipped than most villages in the plains”, mused 
a British official.72 
 
Figure 4. The new face of Naga villages 
Source: CSAS, Pawsey Papers, Box A102, Album 18. 
 
New tastes, new consumption patterns, new living choices were spreading, and these evolving 
habits hinted at other socio-economic changes. Marketisation and labour specialisation were 
on the rise, along with educational levels. Largely self-sufficient before the war, the Meiteis 
had got accustomed to growing a surplus and marketing it to meet the army’s gargantuan 
demands. A budding mercantile community had emerged among them, competing with long-
established Marwari merchants. The Mizos, already familiar with cash-cropping, launched 
their first cooperatives with the help of the Superintendent’s wife.73 And if the majority of the 
Singphos or the Nagas remained cultivators, a growing number were acquiring new skills and 
occupations—there were now Mizo nurses in military hospitals, Naga mechanics and 
contractors, and Chin lorry-drivers.74 Others joined the colonial administration, chronically 
short in manpower, especially now with its European officers away on intelligence missions. 
In their search for educated people, frontier officials recruited school-going Naga boys and 
released literate prisoners. As this could not compensate for the many schools requisitioned by 
the Army, which left many school-going children idle, education became a key preoccupation 
for hill officials. 75 Many tribals agreed—indeed, the Mizo chiefs had explicitly demanded a 
high school before pledging their allegiance to the Allies.76 But not everyone sought 
government intervention. Primary schools were appearing beyond the Inner Line without 
permission and the number of educated tribals was rising extensively, as people clamoured for 
more school facilities.77 Enriched by his activities as a war contractor, an Angami Naga opened 
a school in his home village of Viswema in July 1945, to the cheers of a large crowd who had 
also raised Rs100,000 to constitute a welfare fund.78 
This growing desire for education was part and parcel of cultural and religious change. There 
was for instance the growing popularity in the Lushai hills of things as disparate as the scout 
movement, jeeps, or banjos and ukuleles—the latter merely the newest musical innovation, 
since pre-war Christianisation had already brought in new instruments and musical 
sensitivities.79 These charming examples betrayed more general changes. Already before the 
war, many people in the region were reconfiguring themselves as part of territorialised, 
homogeneous groups. Various communities in the central hills had begun to identify as Nagas, 
while distinctions between the Mizos, Paites, Chins and Kukis had become salient. If 
Christianity had spread through the Lushai Hills, it was because people saw it as a fruitful way 
to represent their evolving concerns—starting with its capacity to symbolise a distinct Mizo 
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identity.80  The war only intensified the coalescence of bounded identities, constructed against 
each other and particularly against plainsmen, whether Indian or Burmese. Ethnically defined 
armed levies were one factor in the process.81 So was Christianity in the Naga areas. It was 
during the conflict that conversions really acquired momentum: the proportion of Christians 
jumped from 18% to 46% between 1941 and 1951. Cash contributions to the Bible Society and 
requests for Angami-language New Testaments multiplied.82 Pan-Naga identity was rapidly 
consolidating and reaching new people. 
 
After the storm 
 
In short, any preconception that the state expansion ushered in by the Second World War also 
entailed the Indianisation of the Patkai runs against the conflict’s transnationalising impact. 
The Inner Line had broken down, but it had broken down to give way to cosmopolitanism 
and—therein lay another ambivalence—to ethnicisation. The last stages of the war would only 
intensify the war’s push-and-pull on the Patkai. Not only would the incredible devastation 
caused by the battles of Imphal and Kohima cause another push of the state into the hills, this 
time in the guise of reconstruction, but the gradual disappearance of the frontline after the 
Japanese invasion would generate yet more upheavals and circulatory networks, further 
vivifying transnational ties. 
By April 1944 the tide of war was shifting. Good news was coming from Europe for the Allies, 
and things were similarly on the upswing in CBI. Allied troops had made successful forays 
into Burma, the construction of the Ledo Road was proceeding apace, and Assam’s railway 
system was increasing its capacity, strengthening Allied positions on the frontline. It was at 
that juncture that Japan invaded India. More than ever, the inhabitants of the Patkai found 
themselves “caught between two imperial propagandas”. The Allies and the Japanese needed 
local manpower, knowledge and goodwill to get the advantage, and indeed to survive. Before 
attacking Imphal, Japanese forces occupied the Chin Hills across from Manipur, setting their 
headquarters at Tiddim. INA divisions accompanied them, ready to liberate India by force 
should the Japanese be successful. Decided attempts to win over local inhabitants had preceded 
the move. Leaflets dropped from the air and conversations with Chin traders who occasionally 
visited Japanese-occupied areas had spread the message that Japan was not the enemy but a 
liberator. Chin soldiers captured during the fall of Burma had been released to emphasize this 
and, once ensconced in Tiddim, the Japanese formed a Chin Defence Army and worked to rally 
locals to their cause.83 
Some Chin chiefs were receptive to that propaganda—perhaps, as with many Naga villagers, 
because they were sensitive to the Japanese’s physical similarities with themselves, unlike 
British or Punjabi soldiers.84 In the Kukis’ case however, support for Japan had a clear political 
motivation. This global war was not of their own making, yet it offered a chance to fulfil long-
standing dreams of freedom from the Raj through a pragmatic alliance with the Japanese.85 The 
Japanese and the INA did not encounter similar degrees of support among the Mizos, Nagas, 
or Kachins however. Although Phizo’s case stands out as an important example of Naga-INA-
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Japan cooperation, many Nagas misinformed the Japanese, informed the Allies and continued 
to join Naga Levies, Armed Nagas, and Naga Pioneers groups.86 Meanwhile, beneath their 
apparent cooperation with the Japanese, many Chins were sending intelligence to the Allies, 
and some educated leaders formed clandestine organisations to repel the latter eventually.87 
Their actions contributed to Allied success at Kohima and Imphal; moreover, local support 
helped the Allies in “clearing up the [invasion’s] after-effects”. When the Japanese began their 
retreat in mid-1944, more Naga labour corps were raised. Others enlisted in “Lydall’s 
Lightfoot”, a para-military unit tasked with capturing stranded enemy soldiers.88 To the south, 
the Japanese found themselves sandwiched between the Lushai Brigade and Chin guerrillas 
like the Sukte Independence Army and the Free Chin.89 
A variety of factors, often locally contingent, likely played a part in the support that the Mizos, 
Nagas, or Kachins extended to the Allies.90 For some historians, the frequent failure of Japanese 
propaganda in the Burma Patkai was due to the fear that, should Japan take over, tribals would 
suffer more than under the British: Japan was allied to Burman nationalists who moved in the 
vanguard of Japanese forces and brutalised ethnic minorities. Good pre-war relations with the 
local colonial official or a V-Force leader were another ground for support in some cases, like 
in the Naga Hills, but not in others.91 The opportunities offered by a society in full upheaval 
might also have played a part. Yet, even in the Lushai Hills, where cooperation was overall 
forthcoming, there is evidence that people rather sought to navigate their way between the two 
camps, contributing to the Total Defence Scheme yet buying ostensibly Japanese goods at the 
bazaar, hoping this would spare them should the Japanese invade.92 What is fairly clear is that 
popular support was a matter of negotiation—fragile, conditional and not pre-given. 
In the end, many of the Patkai’s inhabitants paid a high price for the war, and never more so 
than through the invasion. The battles of Imphal and Kohima turned Assam’s Naga Hills 
District and eastern Manipur into a “scene of desolation”.93 After weeks of relentless fighting 
and bombing, Kohima was a battered shell. Imphal and Dimapur scarcely fared better. 
Moreover, devastation extended well beyond them: many villages were in ruins in the Naga 
Hills, while in parts of Manipur, every single building had reportedly been destroyed. Those 
still standing were often irreparably damaged, troops having removed their doors, window-
frames, or thatch roofs to procure firewood and bamboo kindling. The end of the sieges brought 
its own lot of destruction, for “each village on the line of retreat was defended to the last 
cartridge” by Japanese forces. 
The result was a second humanitarian catastrophe in the Patkai, this time for the inhabitants. 
Trapped in the fighting, many Nagas, Kukis, and Gurkhas left their homes, when they had not 
been killed. Some found refuge in their farmhouses, deep in the river valleys, others fled to the 
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plains. They were joined by Chin and Kachin refugees from the Burma highlands.94 The 
Meiteis sought Imphal’s relative safety or fled to the floating islands on Manipur’s Loktak 
Lake, where they survived on fish and seaweed.95 In occupied areas food supplies stood 
dangerously low. The Japanese had requisitioned rice, cattle, pigs or fowls and seized cooking 
pots, knives, agricultural implements, and any other tools that might serve as weapons. But the 
worst had happened before their arrival: to prepare the defence of Imphal, Anglo-American 
troops had followed a scorched earth policy and forcibly evacuated civilians in less than forty-
eight hours, without even the permission to use empty military trucks to take people’s 
possessions into safety.96 
 
Figures 5-6. Kohima after the siege / Figure 6. Nagas returning to Kohima after the war 
Source: “Into Burma” (New Delhi: Inter Services Public Relations Directorate GHQ, n.d.). 
CSAS, Pawsey Papers, Box 3. 
 
Reminiscent of the 1942 Burma refugee exodus, the only measures taken for civilians during 
the invasion were ad hoc—food and staff had been sent to a camp on the way to Kohima and 
Burma Refugee Organisation (BRO) camps in the foothills had hosted refugees and distributed 
clothing, blankets, medicines and food.97 But the end of the sieges heightened the need for relief 
operations and later for reconstruction, and thereby created yet another momentum of state 
expansion into the Patkai. The Allies had caused much of the destruction and suffering, 
especially since, by most accounts, the Japanese had behaved well in Manipur and the Naga 
Hills. Indeed, locals favourably compared them to the behaviour of the “Punjabis”.98 Colonial 
authorities felt that, to ensure the popular support necessary for Burma’s reconquest, they had 
to show concern for the horrors the war had visited on the Patkai. 
The Assam Governor formed an Assam Relief Measures organisation for war-affected areas, 
irrespective of whether Allies or Japanese had caused the destruction. The priority was to 
prevent starvation and disease. According to one estimate, 15% of the fields around Imphal 
were uncultivated, a percentage that rose to fifty percent in Manipur’s Ukhrul Subdivision, 
dominated by Thangkhul Nagas.99 Epidemics loomed, moreover: 8,000 Nagas had taken refuge 
in malarial areas, the monsoon was at its height, and pigs—the Patkai’s scavengers—had been 
slaughtered. Food and medicines were sent into the hills, the RAF airdropping them when 
necessary, and 16,000 tarpaulins and 2,000 army tents delivered for temporary shelter. As in 
1942, relief administrators had to contend with the army: civilian requirements were 
subordinated to military ones. Trains brought in paltry loads for war sufferers, military 
transport into the hills was almost unavailable, and some BRO camps were requisitioned for 
army purposes. When food and stores for the Paktai’s inhabitants arrived in the foothills, they 
were left lying around. Troops hastily constructed go-downs, but they were of such poor quality 
that the rice rotted. Other than tentage salvaged from military dumps, many civilians thus 
lacked edible food and shelter.100 
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By February 1945, the worst had nevertheless been averted. After long discussions with 
frontier officials, Delhi issued orders for permanent rehabilitation in Manipur and Assam’s 
Naga hills. War damage was to be repaired, houses rebuilt, livestock and household possessions 
replaced, and agricultural self-sufficiency restored. To ascertain a loss, local interpreters 
accompanied by specially recruited staff visited each affected village. Their lists were then 
cross-checked by frontier officials and relief organisers. Even before official orders were given, 
Assam Relief Measures staff began distributing seeds, agricultural implements and cattle. Each 
householder who had lost land or been looted was given seven sorts of vegetable and potato 
seeds. Manipur authorities used a mix of coercion and enticement to get traumatised Meitei 
farmers to resume cultivation, threatening to reduce rations if they did not go home while 
depositing house-building materials on village sites.101 Fortunately, late 1944 yielded a bumper 
crop in the Imphal Valley, easing the food supply situation.102 
In the Patkai however, it was not until spring 1945 that farmers were able to harvest their fields 
again. The administration kept feeding people, whether or not they had evacuated. Thousands 
of rations were issued at a camp just below Kohima, for which the householder was issued a 
certificate. Once the frontline receded, twelve food depots were opened along the Naga Hills 
District’s newly built roads to serve groups of villages. A similar system was launched in 
Manipur. Rations do not seem to have been generous, and initial difficulties in opening depots 
in several unconnected areas forced villagers to walk for three to four days to obtain food, so 
that they ate up a lot of their rations before even reaching home. Where cultivation took time 
to recover, villagers were fed until late 1945. Funds were simultaneously handed out to villages 
to disinfect their springs, and itinerant doctors hiked around the hills to inoculate against 
cholera and typhoid. People who had lost clothing or cooking utensils were supplied with a 
couple of pots and blankets, and boiling pans were handed out to enable Nagas to resume salt 
production from local brine springs. Pigs were imported and axes, hoes, ploughshares and daos 
distributed. Cash and materials were distributed to help the construction of houses and furniture 
and, until traders could return, a lorry acted as a mobile canteen, visiting roadside villages every 
week to deliver the “hundred and one things” that people had come to appreciate during the 
war.103 
None of these measures were recognised as a legal liability by the colonial state. Provincial 
officials’ talk of “compensation” had quickly been quashed by Delhi. Except for property 
requisitioned by the army, “those who had suffered”—they were not called victims—would 
only be granted relief, “similar to those [measures] taken after […] an earthquake or a flood.”104 
Cash was handed out only when assistance in kind was impossible, and the scale of all relief 
limited to “the minimum adequate for the resumption of normal life”.105 Nor would Delhi 
consent to shoulder rehabilitation: Assam was to call upon it only to procure materials 
unavailable locally. Provincial officials counter-argued that this was insufficient, and that 
generosity would not be out of place towards “the people who helped us”. In some cases, they 
succeeded—most importantly perhaps in ensuring that, since it was seldom clear whether 
Allies or Japanese had caused the damage, there would be a unique set of measures.106 It would 
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take much longer for the Indian state to acknowledge its moral responsibility towards the 
people of the Patkai.107  
 
Figure 7. Kohima being rebuilt 




On the face of it, the Second World War had left British Indian authorities in a position of 
control never before experienced by their predecessors in the Patkai. At the same time, the final 
months of the war and its immediate aftermath fostered conditions in which the region’s 
transnational connections further intensified, and indeed acquired new shapes. Few of them 
lent themselves to the easy re-assertion of a reified Indian geo-body that pre-war colonial rule 
had shaped—and yet, decolonisation along these official territorial lines was fast becoming a 
distinct perspective. 
War was not yet over in late 1944. As the frontline receded from Assam and Manipur, the 
Patkai became the springboard for Southeast Asia’s reconquest. Meanwhile, China still needed 
a land link to India. Allied troops continued to pour into Upper Assam, already close to 
saturation.108 The Ledo Road’s construction, which had continued even during the invasion, 
had reached the staggering cost (for the time) of $148 million. But the Burma section was still 
incomplete and existing portions needed protection from the jungle and the rains. On 4 
February 1945, the first convoy finally left Ledo. For the next seven months, thousands of 
vehicles plied the road to Yunnan.109 It was only in September 1945, after Japan’s surrender, 
that Chinese and American troops began to leave Assam in earnest, along with many Chinese 
civilians. 
The departure of troops and workers brought its own lot of changes to north-eastern India. Now 
seemingly in a hurry to leave, Chinese and American troops were disposing of their equipment 
and supplies as fast as possible. Though many of these stocks interested civilian authorities, 
they struggled to retrieve large quantities of material from their allies. More cash-strapped than 
ever, the Assam administration could not afford a large-scale buy-back without central 
assistance; and Delhi, for reasons that are not entirely clear, proved remarkably apathetic on 
this issue. US troops started selling their stocks privately (and surreptitiously), when they did 
not just jettison them all around the place. 110 
The situation led to weakly regulated markets, to the benefit of many. If they knew where to 
ask, private individuals and firms could obtain the right to collect scrap over a given area for a 
relatively small sum. A few managed to obtain ownership certificates for military pipelines, 
whose pipes they began to sell. Some Meiteis took to forging brass pots and ornaments out of 
cartridges cases, others to fishing by explosives or salvaging immobilised military vehicles. 
Damaged or broken down trucks, weapon-carriers, and jeeps were plenty for the taking: many 
had been abandoned after suffering enemy damage or breaking down in places too remote to 
deliver spare parts or enable repair. Despite their lack of formal training in automobile 
engineering, many locals became specialists at turning rusty military vehicles into serviceable 
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engines.111 As for the Ledo Road, it became not a geo-strategic artery—it was too late in the 
war for that—but an economic one, enabling greater movement of goods between China, 
Burma, Tibet and eastern India than ever, untaxed. Assam authorities even suspected Chinese 
troops of importing illegal consumer goods from Yunnan, Sichuan and Burma at the cost of 
the US army and without declaring it. The road, yesterday the pride of Allied wartime 
achievements, had morphed an engine of systematic and large-scale smuggling.112 
What most concerned late colonial authorities was that guns and ammunition were 
proliferating. Prior to 1942, colonial authorities had devoted much effort to disarming the 
people of the Patkai. The war had turned the policy on its head: to help in the fight against 
Japan, tribals had been re-armed, and with more modern weapons. This was without counting 
the disturbingly high number of arms reported lost during the fighting—in fact, Assam 
authorities suspected some Allied troops of purposely losing their arms. Now that the conflict 
was over, departing soldiers were moreover leaving behind quantities of unused ammunition 
and weapons. Many were likely broken or obsolete, but enough remained serviceable, once 
salvaged. The wartime expansion of trade routes facilitated the circulation of arms and 
ammunition from the Patkai to the eastern Himalayas and the Southeast Asia Massif. Khampa 
and Han merchants from Atzuntze in Yunnan had begun trading with Sadiya in Upper Assam, 
explaining the abundance of ammunition in the Lohit Valley, just north of the Patkai.113 “[G]un 
barrels, if not complete guns, certainly reach the Mishmi from Tibet”, noted a frontier official; 
“judging from the lavish expenditure on ammunition on even the smallest birds there must be 
an ample supply.”114 In Burma, the Shan states, Bhamo, and Myitkyina were also witnessing 
proliferation.115 Anxieties regarding heavily armed post-war populations were highest 
regarding the Naga-inhabited parts of the Patkai, where inter-village raids were, or had been, a 
common practice. Long worried about the spread of modern warfare technologies among the 
Nagas, frontier officers feared that, thanks to their own wartime strategy of arming them, a 
“widespread massacre” was in the offing.116 Some officers disagreed with the project of 
disarming people however, arguing they needed the guns for peaceful purposes, like saving 
their crops from wildlife’s depredations.117 
From 1945 onwards, “surrender” campaigns were organised in Burmese and Indian frontier 
districts. Quantities of weapons were recovered from the Nagas as the frontline receded. 
Authorities in Manipur were slower to act but succeeded in retrieving more arms around 
1949.118 Overall, these campaigns seem to have been peaceful, perhaps because, more often 
than not, the “surrender” of weapons involved buying them from the villagers. Notwithstanding 
the limited capabilities of civilian authorities to retrieve weapons by force, they could with 
difficulty explain why, having re-armed tribal populations they had for decades sought to 
disarm, they were suddenly changing their mind. Individuals in possession of firearms and 
ammunition were not forced to hand them out but paid to do so—quite handsomely. No overall 
figures are forthcoming for Assam, but nearly a million rupees were spent on recovering arms 
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around Myitkyina, in northern Burma.119 Even some “head-hunting” villages were paid to 
release their weapons.120 Frontier authorities initially felt satisfied that surrender campaigns 
had worked. Yet, ten years after the war, Assam authorities had to admit that attempts to curb 
gun proliferation had failed. Reports from the Manipur and Naga Hills showed that quantities 
of weapons were still in possession of the inhabitants, and more yet lay abandoned in half-
forgotten military dumps somewhere in the Patkai jungle.121  
Colonial sources of the period are full of comments about “smuggling”, “black markets”, 
“pilfering”, “banditry”, and “ill-gotten gains”. The end of the war appears as a period of crime 
and lawlessness, during which the residence of the Manipur Political Agent could be broken 
into and government cars cannibalised for their electrical apparatus. The dangerous presence 
of unexploded bombs, discarded military property, and army dumps that had not been blown 
up added to the characterisation.122 The very language used in these reports tried to cloak a 
murky situation involving a variety of state- and non-state actors, and where the distinction 
between the two (or between the licit and the illicit, the stateless and the ruled, regulated and 
deregulated markets), far from a black-and-white dichotomy, was often unclear. It also glossed 
over the fact that the Meiteis or the Nagas were likely seeking goods and  lifestyles they had 
got accustomed to during the war.123 Above all, official qualms betrayed late colonial 
hesitations in the face of the socio-economic reconfigurations engendered by the war, 
reconfigurations that vivified the Patkai’s integration into trans-regional and world markets 
that largely escaped their control, and in which local people could, and indeed would, engage. 
And this was occurring just as the transfer of power was emerging on top of India and Burma’s 
agenda. 
Indeed, a strong political dimension underlay the unsettled atmosphere of the conflict’s 
immediate aftermath. The first signs of political mobilisation in the Patkai dated back to the 
First World War and locals’ conscription into auxiliary forces.124 War veterans had brought 
back novel experiences, tastes, and aspirations, catalysing political awareness and mobilisation 
among them and the educated minority.125 A Naga Club had been founded in 1918. As was the 
case with socio-cultural change, the Second World War amplified this mobilisation. The Kukis 
had fought with the INA for their own purposes. Songs about the war (Japan Gal La) expressed 
their continued wish for self-rule, separate from India.126 Though more on the Allies side, 
Lushai Hills inhabitants held not too dissimilar aspirations: the Mizo and Paite chiefs had 
answered McCall’s call on the premise they would thereby gain self-determination. An implicit 
condition to their support was that “the destiny of Lushais passes to no other hands without the 
consent of the Lushai peoples” after the war.127 Many frontier officials agreed with this, 
especially if they supported the Crown Colony Scheme. McCall had sought to foster a pan-
Mizo identity the Lushai Hills in the 1930s, transcending the divide “between Christians and 
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non-Christians”128. By mobilising every single village in the District in the name of “our land”, 
to be defended by all and at all cost against an alien enemy, the Total Defence Scheme furthered 
these aims. In 1946, the founding of the Mizo Union marked the birth of organised politics 
among the Mizos. And yet, here too nation-building could actually entail a breach or distance 
with India, rather than union with it. Many Lushais felt different from the Indians, and the 
chiefs—if not the commoners—had no appetite for an independent India where they would 
likely lose their social and political position.129 
As already seen, a similar consolidation of pan-Naga identity took place due to the war, 
reaching the masses beyond the elites. Also in 1945-46, a Naga National Council was created 
to represent the various Naga tribes on a proportional basis. In an echo of Mizo concerns, its 
goal was to ensure the representation of the Nagas and their wish for self-determination in the 
context of decolonisation, now on the agenda in India and Burma alike.130 Political activism 
was fuelled by rumours about the defunct Crown Colony Scheme and the support of many 
frontier officials, who saw themselves as the appointed guardians of highland tribes.131 For 
some Nagas, including Phizo, independence from Britain and from India was the only 
acceptable option, and they would fight for that aim for decades to come. Between revived 
transregional ties, heightened ethnicisation and rapid politicisation along fault lines alien to the 
Congress-League tussle, the war had ensured that decolonisation would not be a simple affair 
in the Patkai. 
 
Figure 8. Nagas shifting a 2nd Division memorial stone 




After a long period of disinterest, historians have in recent years started to move beyond 
partition and independence-centric studies to give the Second World War pride of place in 
accounts of the transition to post-colonial South Asia. 132  The importance of the conflict was 
perhaps nowhere greater than in north-eastern India.  By 1945, the face of the Patkai had 
durably changed. The Second World War had been a concentrated period of change at all 
levels—social, cultural, military, political, administrative, religious, economic. The landscape 
had been mapped more finely than ever before, and then remodelled for military purposes. 
Forests had been cut down to make way for airfields, arsenals and hospitals. Hamlets had turned 
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into villages, villages into towns. Strangers from all around the globe had arrived in the hills, 
some never to go back. Wage labour and the cash economy had made deeper inroads, boosted 
by an unprecedented influx of goods, insatiable needs for manpower and food, and the 
appearance of a number of specialised jobs. Demands for education and political empowerment 
had spread and intensified. “I don’t believe that, having heard the legions thunder past, the 
people will go back unchanged to their old ways of thinking and living”, reflected the Assam 
Governor.133 
This article has notably insisted on how the Second World War led the Indian state to “climb 
the hills”,134 after acting at a distance or by proxy. Its physical presence could henceforth be 
seen in countless ways: the hair-spinning, but metaled roads; the transit camps; the new or 
expanded administrative outposts; the relief and rehabilitation staff rushing through the 
countryside. Now reluctant to play “second fiddle” to the missionaries, frontier officials sought 
to build their own schools and dispensaries in the name of post-war “reconstruction”.135 This 
outlook also betrayed a pan-Indian and trans-national turn towards “development”, partly 
brought on in colonial administrative circles by the war itself.136 
But if the Second World War had been a state-building agent, it had also been a de- or trans-
nationalising one. India and Burma’s frontier administrations had become welded together 
even as state penetration in the Patkai dramatically extended. In the wartime Arakan Hill Tracts 
or northwestern Burma’s Naga and Kachin areas, “government” really meant Assam. As 
importantly, the conflict revivified the ties with Tibet, with Burma, with China that had 
historically marked the Patkai’s societies, while it intensified the interaction between the region 
and the world at large. Assam as a whole was then englobed in the notion of “Southeast Asia” 
coalescing as a result of the war.137 “[T]he frontier of India is today gone to pieces”, wrote a 
war correspondent in January 1946. “No matter if some of these roads built with the human 
labour that India supplied were closed, Assam is in a position to look beyond the boundaries 
of India to Burma and Greater Indies.’138 
Looking at the Second World War in north-eastern India in terms of push-and-pull effects 
offers several further insights. Firstly, thinking of war in terms of transnational history helps 
us probe further the disjunctions between state-making and nation-building. At another level, 
the case of the Patkai hints that the narrative of the Second World War in southern Asia looks 
very different on land than on sea. Whereas the conflict led to the interruption of ocean-borne 
links between India and south-eastern Asia, as scholars of the Indian Ocean point out, the 
reverse was true on dry ground, where Assam and the Patkai rediscovered their transnational 
context. 139 
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The war’s third and final insight revolves around the Patkai highlands’ recent history as part 
of independent India and Burma—a trajectory that included various self-determination 
movements among the Kachins, Nagas or Mizos, often in the shape of violent struggles against 
the Raj’s successor states.140 Long-standing debates about the origins of these movements have 
focused on colonial rule in general and on the transfer of power in 1947-48. What becomes 
apparent, from this article, is that decolonisation’s characterisation as a victorious freedom 
struggle was problematic in the Patkai also due to its juxtaposition with the Second World War. 
A mere couple of years after a global conflict had opened up (or re-opened) the Patkai to a 
world of which India and Burma were but a part, the two countries acquired independence—
trapping local people within supposedly “national” borders. A sign of this shift had occurred 
in October 1945 with the reversal of Assam and Manipur to India’s Old Standard Time, less 
suited to their easterly geographic locations. The decision would come to haunt Delhi’s 
relations with northeastern India.141 The independence of India, Pakistan and Burma as separate 
and bounded entities hence appears jarring in light of the war that had immediately preceded 
them. Like the rest of Zomia, the Patkai was “sliced into pieces” between different countries at 
the very moment it had become more integrated with its transnational surroundings.142 
This brutal severance was only one of the legacies left by the Second World War in the India-
Burma borderlands. In Burma, the conflict led to “the institutionalisation of highly centrifugal, 
decentralized forms of control over violence”, which would destabilise the post-colonial state; 
similar trends could be discerned on the Indian side of the border.143 Aspirations for self-rule 
had not only grown during the war, but the service rendered had left many in the Patkai 
counting on the transfer of power to renegotiate territorial imaginations. Late colonial 
discussions around the creation of the Crown Colony did not outlast the war, but they 
reinforced these expectations. Moreover, the capacity of the Mizos or the Nagas to stand up to 
the Indian military was boosted by the ready availability of Second World War weapons left 
behind in the region. Beneath the fissures created by the juxtaposition of independence and the 
Second World War lay the making of “durable disorder” in India’s northeast.144 
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